Talk:Operation Sea Lion/Archive 2

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Barbarossa

We need RS making the link,.Slatersteven (talk) 15:09, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Hitler and the German High Command began discussing the preparations for Barbarossa in late July 1940: http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/GPO/hitler1940.htm (2A00:23C4:6384:600:7546:2C24:D02E:627D (talk) 15:15, 22 August 2017 (UTC))
A. I am not sure this is RS, B. It makes no mention of Sealion. So inclusion of this (even if this is RS) fails as OR.Slatersteven (talk) 15:26, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
In addition, this says nothing about the chances of success, so even if we do keep this it is in the wrong section.Slatersteven (talk) 15:42, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Operation Sea Lion#Discussion – "The first joint services conference on the proposed invasion was held by Hitler in Berlin on 21 July, .... Hitler's main interest was the question of countering potential Russian intervention. Halder outlined his first thoughts on defeating Russian forces. Detailed plans were to be made to attack the Soviet Union." cited to Bungay 2000, pp. 112–113. . . . dave souza, talk 17:53, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Forgive me this does not support "By late July 1940 the German High Command was already planning the invasion of the Soviet Union", as it says plans were to be made, not had been made.Slatersteven (talk) 17:57, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Bungay p. 110 "4 July: Made aware by von Weizsäcker that Russia could be on the agenda and anxious not to be caught napping by a sudden demand for plans, Halder gave General Marcks, the Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, the job of putting some first ideas together about how the Soviet Union could be attacked." pp/ 112–113 "Hitler then turned to his main topic, which he had convinced himself was a related one: Russia. The Russian problem had to be dealt with, Halder had already prepared some preliminary thoughts on the strength of forces needed to eliminate the Red Army. Detailed plans were to be prepared." .. dave souza, talk 18:38, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
This does not say they were already planing operation Barbarossa, it says they had thought about plans. And (again) what has this to do with Sealions chances of success?Slatersteven (talk) 19:00, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

It's relevant to invasion planning, and so is covered there. Don't think the source explicitly discusses the effect of this divergence of [preliminary] planning effort on the [lack of] success of Seelöwe, the connection may be covered elsewhere. . . dave souza, talk 19:28, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Is it can you quote the source saying it was? If the source does not say we we cannot infer it.Slatersteven (talk) 12:09, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
Having looked through the rest of Bungay's chapter, the points it makes are covered in the #Invasion planning section, and i've not found any inference that the dual planning contributed to the [already likely] failure of Seelöwe . . dave souza, talk 18:54, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
So it has no place in the chances of Success section.Slatersteven (talk) 07:58, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
None supported by that source, in my reading. Another source may draw a connection, but a citation to it would be needed to keep it in the chances of Success section. . . dave souza, talk 04:10, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

It wasn't a real plan

Closing discussion initiated by banned HarveyCarter.
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.

Hitler never intended to invade the UK, only the Soviet Union. The German High Command was already planning Barbarossa at the beginning of July 1940. Sea Lion was a bluff to put pressure on the British government to end the war. (5.81.222.244 (talk) 12:23, 3 September 2017 (UTC))

No, it was talking about planning. Moreover it does not matter what we think it says, we go with what RS say.Slatersteven (talk) 12:31, 3 September 2017 (UTC)

5.81.222.244 is yet another sock of community banned HarveyCarter and has been blocked. Favonian (talk) 12:35, 3 September 2017 (UTC)

If we get another IP showing up to add the same source and material I think a page protection might be in order.Slatersteven (talk) 12:40, 3 September 2017 (UTC)
The fact OKW was planning to invade SU at the same time proves exactly nothing. Simultaneous planning is routine, or operations would have to stop while planning is completed. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:42, 3 September 2017 (UTC)
Like this [[1]], another IP.Slatersteven (talk) 16:04, 5 September 2017 (UTC)

Chances of success : "Kenneth Macksey asserts it would have been possible only if the Royal Navy had refrained from large-scale intervention"

Could somebody point out to me why this quote is in the article ? The RN`s sole purpose was (and is) to defend Great Britain, so under what possible, much less realistic, set of circumstances would they not "intervene on a large scale" in an invasion of the British mainland ? ! ? I`d have thought it certain they`d accept any degree of losses in order to prevent the invasion succeeding. Indeed, that`s the only logical position.--JustinSmith (talk) 21:54, 2 January 2018 (UTC)

@JustinSmith: When I read the passage, I interpret it as underscoring how low the chances of success would have been (only given a highly unlikely pre-condition) while also highlighting how the Royal Navy would have played a large role in making any planned invasion futile and costly. I don't have the book from the footnote (which presumably refers to a later edition of the cited 1980 Macksey work) but perhaps a clearer phrasing would be "if the Royal Navy were unable to engage in large-scale intervention", but the RN remained far superior to the Kriegsmarine, as the other sources in the paragraph make clear.-Ich (talk) 22:20, 2 January 2018 (UTC)
Macksey's point underscores something else: RN's dislike of operating heavies in confined waters (like the Channel). In other words, the theory goes, RN would only have deployed (rather limited numbers of) destroyers, & not battleships or even cruisers. That said, DDs would be enough to wipe the floor with the German landing barges...but would be vulnerable to Luftwaffe in a way anything heavier wouldn't be. So it's not a trivial qualifier. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 07:07, 3 January 2018 (UTC)


I agree that the RN would have been loathe to deploy battleships or even cruisers into the channel, but I don`t think they`d have been any qualms about sending the maximum number of destroyers in there. As you say they wouldn`t need to be any bigger than that anyway, and DDs are smaller, faster and more maneuverable, i.e. much harder to hit. This quote from Andrew Gordon`s article is relevant :

"to inflict serious losses the Luftwaffe would have had to discover capacities it had yet to demonstrate and yet to train for. Off Norway, the Home Fleet had been bombed for days on end, but only two of its destroyers (out of an inventory of over eighty) were sunk. During Dunkirk, many destroyers were damaged by air attack, and for a while the most valuable ones were withdrawn (in the manner of Fighter Command from France), but none of the four sunk by the Luftwaffe were in open water and free to manoeuvre at speed when fatally attacked. In brief, the war so far had provided no evidence that, in extremis, air-power – German or British – was a naval operations show-stopper."

I think that just about sums it up.

"I interpret it as underscoring how low the chances of success [for Sealion] would have been"

many Wikipedia readers may not interpret it as such, that is the problem I have with it.--JustinSmith (talk) 15:53, 3 January 2018 (UTC)

How about reordering the sentence – "Kenneth Macksey asserts it would have been possible only if the Germans had assaulted in July 1940 (although they were unprepared at that time) and there had been no large-scale intervention by the Royal Navy in response." Clearer? .. dave souza, talk 17:33, 3 January 2018 (UTC)
I'm honestly not seeing how you can read it any way except to emphasize probable German failure. The reordering wouldn't hurt, but I'm wondering why it needs to be wordier. Also, if we're after clarity, "large-scale intervention" merits pointing out Macksey meant "no heavies" & "few DDs". (My understanding is, there were quite a few Home Fleet DDs detailed to other duty, not least convoys, which appear to have been the bottom priority, which I frankly find shocking & inexplicable.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:48, 4 January 2018 (UTC)

You have to always bear in mind there`ll be people reading the Sealion article (and other Wikipedia articles) who don`t actually know much about the subject. Some guy reading that Macksey comment in the article could take that literally, and start telling his mates down the pub ! I have some sympathy for him, "if an historian is implying its possible the RN wouldn`t have intervened on a large scale then possibly they might not have done, and therefore the Germans may have been able to successfully invade Britain and change the whole course of the war". Basically saying the Germans could have invaded the UK had the RN not intervened "on a large scales (whatever that means) is like saying Bomber command could have flattened Germany had the Luftwaffe not intervened "on a large scale. Basically it`s meaningless and open to incorrect interpretation.--JustinSmith (talk) 14:13, 5 January 2018 (UTC)

You have to bear in mind we go with what RS say. Now there seems to be some disagreement in RS about the RN, so we reflect that in out wording by attributing views, not interpreting them.Slatersteven (talk) 14:28, 5 January 2018 (UTC)
"Basically it`s meaningless and open to incorrect interpretation" Only when you read something that the sentence doesn't actually say. "Some guy reading that Macksey comment in the article could take that literally" And if you read the actual sentence, it says German success was continent on the RN not intervening; it expressly does not say "The Germans would have succeeded except the RN stopped them", which you appear to be claiming. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 17:12, 6 January 2018 (UTC)
I have not said it.Slatersteven (talk) 17:35, 6 January 2018 (UTC)

I did not state that it said "The Germans would have succeeded except the RN stopped them. But it certainly implies it is possible that Sealion could have succeeded had the RN not intervened on a large scale. But, because it is impossible that the RN wouldn`t have intervened on a large scale it is an utterly misleading and, indeed, pointless sentence.--JustinSmith (talk) 12:41, 13 January 2018 (UTC)

  • Having made the good faith assumption that others had read the source, it took me until now to hunt out Kenneth Macksey (19 January 2015). Invasion: The Alternative History of the German Invasion of England, July 1940. Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-4738-7761-0. – note the subtitle as republished. This is fictional alternate history, so suspect it doesn't belong in this section. . . dave souza, talk 18:42, 14 January 2018 (UTC)
  • It's definitely borderline, however given that he's an historian, and the way that you've now framed it, I think it's OK. Counterfactuals can be a valid method for historians to present their ideas. On the other hand, I wouldn't be overly concerned if it was removed. Beyond My Ken (talk) 22:31, 14 January 2018 (UTC)
  • As I understand it this is the scenario Mackey thinks is reasonable for any real chance of German success. But is is not really a historical analysis, and I have long wondered why it is here.Slatersteven (talk) 10:02, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
  • Why do you say that it's "not real historical analysis"? Counter-factuals are a standard methodology for historians to explore the circumstances in which history might have turned out differently, the clear purpose of which is to reflect on history as it did happen. That is analysis, albeit presented in a different form. Beyond My Ken (talk) 11:12, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
Because this goes way beyond "circumstances in which history might have turned out differently" and into "creating a scenario where a given outcome is assured. If Invasion 1940 had been an examination of what the world might have been like with a NAZI victory then it is fair enough to call what Macksey did an exploration of how things might have turned out differently.
True he does spend about a page and a half saying "and it was that fatal choice that altered the course of the war". As well as "and by the time the Germans were ready it was impossible". But for our purposes Invasion 1940 makes too many assumptions that are "counter factual" to be of value as a source of historical analysis, as after the Raeder meeting of 12 may 1940 it totally diverges from history. From that point on it is not a real analysis of what might have been, it is a work of total fiction.Slatersteven (talk) 11:43, 15 January 2018 (UTC)
I disagree. Historians are eminently qualified to make those kinds of analyses based on counter-factual assumptions, and their conclusions are valid as their opinion, which, if you notice, is what is being presented by the other historians in the section.
The facts are that the Luftwaffe failed to knock out the RAF in the Battle of Britain, and that Operation Sealion was then put on permanent hold. The why and wherefores that connect these two points are based on both factual evidence and the analysis of the meaning and weight of that evidence. The facts are what they are, but the analyses are opinions, whether done in a straight-forward manner or done through the back door with counter-factuals.
As long as the analyst is qualified, and the evidence treated properly, it's not for us to say which methodology they use is acceptable and which is not. I see no reason to reject Macksey's judgment simply because it was reached by way of an alternative reality. If someone can show that Macksey is not qualified, or that he played fast and loose with known facts in building his counter-factual, that's a different matter, but no one has yet done so. Beyond My Ken (talk) 00:12, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
But Invasion 1940 goes beyond that into making choices such as assumptions about where (and how) the British might counterattack or how effective that might be. It goes beyond examining alternative choices and how they may have affected the outcome into fictional descriptions of battles that would be unaffected by counter factual choices. Nor is it a question of his qualifications, a historian can write fiction, that does not mean it is a factual book, any more then Carl Sagan was writing a factual book with Contact. That is why we could use it for a factual statement, made as a factual statement.Slatersteven (talk) 08:33, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
Not having read the book, I cannot make a comment on whether I think it is fiction or an historical counter-factual analysis. All I can note is that Google, Amazon and Barnes & Noble all classify it under "History", and not under "Fiction", that Niall Ferguson references it in his Virtual History: Alternatives And Counterfactuals, and that there is a difference between an historian exploring "alternate history" and one writing a work of outright fiction. Beyond My Ken (talk) 17:08, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
Well this may be a question for RSN then.Slatersteven (talk) 17:11, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
Yes, that is a possibility.
I do want to point out that Sagan was clearly writing an intentional work of fiction: there are characters, a plot, all the hallmarks of a novel. From all the descriptions I've seen of Invasion (or Invasion 1940) that doesn't appearto be the case, its focus appears to be on the "what if" - and nothing else I've seen in Macksey's body of work indicates an interest in writing fiction, as opposed to military history.
I'm considering ordering a copy of the book and taking a look for myself. Beyond My Ken (talk) 17:18, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
The other thing is, sure, under historical conditions the RN didn't commit heavy ships to Channel warfare. But given the stakes of any invasion, it seems entirely plausible that were things to have gone differently, the entire future of the nation would be staked on control of the Channel. I find it hard to believe that, with the freedom of the British Isles hanging in the balance, that the Admiralty would not have thrown every available ship into the battle - or at the very least one or two of the more aged R-class battleships. Even if it was able to wreak havoc among the barges for only a few hours, trading an old battleship or two for several Nazi divisions' worth of invasion fleet must be said to be a fair trade for the UK. NorthBySouthBaranof (talk) 17:42, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
And even if the Admiralty had balked, their civilian masters would certainly have over-ridden their objections, I'm quite sure. Churchill had previously been First Lord of the Admiralty, and I don't think he had any compunction about throwing his weight around against the Sea Lords. Beyond My Ken (talk) 17:48, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
Politically and image wise it would have destroyed the royal navy to be seen to be hiding whilst the Army and RAF fought and died "on the beeches". It would be possible to imagine Churchill's famous speech before the Government in exile "Never has so much been lost for so many by so few".
But this is all a bit osoapboxy and ORy now.Slatersteven (talk) 17:56, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
Historiographers like to call them "counter-factuals", but don't like the term "alternate history", which it really is. The line between analysis & pure fiction in any of them is pretty thin, & in this case (& I've read it), Macksey loads the dice for the Germans pretty heavily. He makes no secret of and it, however: he's looking for what conditions were needed for Germany to succeed. That's a common approach in AH: you ask the question, "What would it take?" & then try & answer it within credible parameters of probability. Macksey does it. It's never unbelievable. (It's also really well written.) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 00:22, 17 January 2018 (UTC)
I've ordered the book, so I'll be able to read it soon, but your comment is why I said in my original response that counter-factuals are a borderline case - I think it all depends on the historian/analyst involved and their command of the complexities of the circumstances. If, as you say, Macksey has to strongly load the dice in favor of the Nazis, and makes a good case that anything less than those extreme conditions would wind up with a German loss, that's pretty good evidence that the actual historical conditions were just not favorable for the success of Sealion. It's not proof of course, but history doesn't actually allow us to turn back the clock and roll again with new conditions and choices - the "alternate history" is the closest we can come to it.
Which brings up the question, what do other reliable historians say about Macksey's analysis? Beyond My Ken (talk) 01:43, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

The standard German antitank gun, the 37 mm Pak 36, was capable of penetrating the armour of all 1940 British tanks except the Matilda and Valentine.

This sentence implies that the 37mm could penetrate the armour of most British tanks. Does anyone know the %age of British tanks available in SE England (in late summer / early autumn) 1940 which were notBold text either if the aforementioned models ? This is important because if the answer is a minority then the sentence is misleading ?--JustinSmith (talk) 14:25, 5 January 2018 (UTC) Yes it is known exactly how many tanks there were, and the largest number were the light tank Mk VI, which had such thin armour it could be penetrated by MG 34 armour-piercing bullets (a light tank commander in Crete described his tank as being "like Swiss Cheese" after it was shot at by such a weapon). The light tank Mk VI was the main equipment of the 2nd Armoured division (commanded by Norrie). The cruiser tanks made up the bulk of the other tanks, all of which had very thin armour. The Valentines didn't start appearing until October 1940 in any numbers, which leaves the Matildas, which were mainly concentrated in a few Army Tank Brigades and formed a small part of the force overall. This situation changed as more tanks were produced. I suggest reading "We Shall Fight Them" by Ian Lofting for the distribution of forces in 1940.Sitalkes (talk) 22:20, 6 February 2019 (UTC) and Newbold for the exact figures (Newbold, David John. "British planning and preparations to resist invasion on land, September 1939 – September 1940")Sitalkes (talk) 02:34, 7 February 2019 (UTC).

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